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Abstract
This study uses data from the survey IFLS-4 (Indonesia Family Live Surveys-wave 4) to analyze the impact 
of competition between lenders on client behaviour. IFLS-4 contains data on self-reported habits of 
community residents (312 community) decision to access to Islamic Micro Finance Institution (Islamic MFI), 
named Baitul Maal wat Tamwil (BMT). This data contains speciﬁc type of BMT’s location which could be 
accessed by community, with variously geographical distances. This data also is enriched by the presence of 
another type of conventional MFI. This study found that increased competition suggesting clients to change 
their behaviour. The presence of conventional MFI and theirs proximity as indicator of competition, very 
instrumental in determining access to BMT. Interesting ﬁnding, for religious type borrowers, they tend to 
sustain their access to BMT whose more far geographical distance, even conventional MFI presence inside 
their village. Thus, this study suggests that the expansion of ﬁnancial inclusion strategy of Islamic MFI should 
also be speciﬁcally determined by behaviour of and the BMT’s location among the community.
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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, after years of rapid microﬁnance 
market growth, poor microﬁnance borrowers 
begin experiencing repayment diﬃculties and 
defaulting on their loans. Their MFI resort 
to harsh and coercive methods to secure loan 
recovery. Chen et al. (2010) stated that the 
micro ﬁnance repayment crises in Pakistan, 
Nicaragua, Morocco and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
were preceded by the unprecedented growth 
of all emerging micro ﬁnance markets from 
2004 to 2008. The latter experienced average 
annual asset growth of 39 percent and had 
accumulated total assets of over US $ 60 
billion by December 2008. The growth 
period, however, would engender crisis in 
the four concerned countries because of three 
core “vulnerabilities” in their respective micro 
ﬁnance industries: (1) concentrated market 
competition and multiple borrowing, (2) 
overstretched MFI systems and controls and 
(3) erosion of MFI lending discipline. 
Consequently, many borrowers are 
forced to borrow at exorbitant rates from 
moneylenders in order to repay. Schicks and 
Rosenberg (2011) analyzed the repayment 
crises from the perspective of the client 
in terms of the problem of client “over-
indebtedness.” Borrowers may be taking 
loans from several lenders simultaneously, 
or 'double-dipping'. Micro ﬁnance market 
competition and saturation-together with 
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the associated phenomena of client multiple 
borrowing-are identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant factor 
that tends to increase over-indebtedness. 
It happens when lenders, in their quest for 
expansion and increased market share, resort 
to over-aggressive marketing practices and lose 
discipline with regard to their internal risk 
management systems. 
The reasons attributed to borrowers for 
double-dipping are to smooth the timing of 
repayment of loans, to maintain cash ﬂow, and 
the fact that interspersing several smaller loans 
leads to a lower overall cost of credit given 
the declining-balance interest calculations 
prevalent in the industry. Marquez (2002) 
highlights the fact that competition lowers 
the screening ability of the incumbent bank, 
thus increasing the share of low quality 
borrowers among clients. In Petersen and 
Rajan (1998), competition weakens the 
long-term relationship between a lender 
and his clients, thus reducing the lender's 
incentives to provide insurance in response 
to shocks. 
The repayment performance and behaviour 
of micro ﬁnance clients have been modelled in 
diﬀerent ways in the micro ﬁnance literature 
(Fischer and Ghatak 2011, Karlan and 
Morduch 2013, Gonzalez 2008, Schicks 
2011). Much of early theoretical work was 
devoted to explaining how high loan recovery 
rates were made possible by joint liability-an 
arrangement in which borrowers are grouped 
together and held jointly liable for each other’s 
repayments. As the use of individual liability 
loans became more common in micro ﬁnance, 
one subsequent eﬀort of theorists focused 
on micro ﬁnance loan contract mechanisms 
beyond joint liability that ensured high 
repayment rates, including dynamic incentives 
and regular repayment schedules. In time, 
theory also began to model the incentive eﬀects 
of micro ﬁnance market competition and 
multiple borrowing as well as the problem of 
over-indebtedness of borrowers. 
In this paper, we exploit the increasingly 
intense interactions between MFIs in 
Indonesia both Islamic and conventional using 
IFLS-4 data in 2007 to analyze how borrowers 
at community level respond to competition 
between diﬀerent kinds of lenders. We 
begin by reviewing the major theoretical 
predictions found in the literature and, on 
that basis, develop our hypotheses explaining 
client behaviour that can be taken to the 
data. We perform two diﬀerent but related 
analyses. First, we examine the determinants 
of borrowers access type decisions to BMT, 
and so that gain an understanding of the 
market segments occupied by diﬀerent 
kinds of borrowers. Second, we look at the 
diﬀerential eﬀect of competition from various 
attribute of lenders such as their presence and 
proximity on individual clients with speciﬁc 
characteristics.
This study found that the borrowers 
indeed tend to change their behaviour due to 
rising competition among MFI (Islamic vs. 
conventional). The remainder of this paper will 
introduce the methodology used. This section 
will discuss data sources and measurement 
religiosity status as the primary dependent 
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variable and some other control variables in 
both level of individuals, households and 
communities such as risk preferences, business 
ownership status (non-farm), the average 
expenditure per ca pita and social capital. 
Part 3 is an empirical analysis, which aims to 
assess whether the distance BMT-community 
and religiosity status, signiﬁcantly aﬀect access 
to BMT. Finally, Section 4 discusses some 
policy implications to expand and maintain 
the sustainability of BMT.
Previous Study
Although papers rarely directly address 
the eﬀect of increased competition in absence 
of information sharing on repayment rates, it 
can indirectly be inferred in some cases. Besley 
and Coate (1995) showed how joint liability 
can help lenders in markets without observable 
lending histories overcome information 
problems, but also that such contracts 
remain vulnerable to strategic behaviour by 
the entire lending group. The implication is 
that increased competition could lead to a 
higher incidence of group default. Marquez 
(2002) highlighted the fact that competition 
lowers the screening ability of the incumbent 
bank, thus increasing the share of low quality 
borrowers among clients. In Petersen and 
Rajan (1998), competition weakens the long-
term relationship between a lender and his 
clients, thus reducing the lender's incentives to 
provide insurance in response to shocks. Both 
circumstances would lead to lower repayment 
rates. Most pertinent is a paper by Hoﬀ and 
Stiglitz (1998) which examines the role that 
multiple uncollateralized lenders will play in 
reducing each other's abilities to use dynamic 
incentives eﬀectively. 
The important for incumbent micro-
lenders is also to know which types of 
individuals are most likely to be drawn away 
from them by competition. Conning (1999) 
and Navajas, Conning, and Gonzales-Vega 
(2002) presented models in which diﬀerential 
abilities at collateral collection, screening, and 
monitoring lead diﬀerent types of lending 
institutions to focus on diﬀerent client bases. 
According to this theory, considering that 
our data consist solely of current clients in a 
village-banking institution, we would expect 
to see the 'best' clients being drawn away by 
lenders who invest more in screening and oﬀer 
better terms. Additionally, considering that 
the pre-eminent role of collateral in mitigating 
moral hazard in lending, clients who depart for 
higher-level lenders should be those that posse 
the used assets to those lenders as collateral 
and as screening tools.
Talking about client features, with the 
special characteristics of Islamic micro 
ﬁnance contracts that do not charge interest 
on the loan, then it can be said that Islamic 
micro ﬁnance is expected to be of interest to 
individuals who are more religious. Consumers 
who are religious are basically beneﬁcial to 
both parties, both micro ﬁnance institutions 
(sharia) as producer or (prospective) borrower 
as consumers. In terms of micro-ﬁnance 
institutions, in the context of the model of 
whether individual-based or group-based 
lending, religiosity (which is transformed 
into a form of behaviour according to 
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the guidelines of religion) is an important 
indicator of potential borrowers who are 
considered to be a proxy for social collateral 
(replaces physical collateral) as well as reduce 
the potential for moral hazard of potential 
borrowers (Berggren, 2014). According to 
this context, we hypothesized that the more 
religious consumer will not shifting (reduce) 
their access (probability) to Islamic MFI.
This study is interesting because previous 
studies that discuss competition between 
microﬁnance institutions of Islam MFI 
vs. Conventional MFI are still rare. Many 
studies analyze competition between these 
two institutions, but still limited at banking 
industry level, not at MFI one. Besides that, the 
study also focuses on the comparative aspects 
of the performance of ﬁnancial institutions 
side such as the impact of competition on 
proﬁt. There are still rarely discussing its 
impact on the borrower side. If anything, the 
comparison of the borrower is limited to their 
socio-economic characteristics as a client on 
these two institutions. There fore, this study 
tries to ﬁll the void of the study.
METHODOLOGY
To investigate this hypothesis, this 
study is designed as take advantage of the 
availability of data on the type of access to 
BMT questionnaire of Indonesia Family Live 
Survey (IFLS) wave 4.
Data
The main data set for analysis is the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), 
socio-economic household survey based on 
a sample representing 83% of Indonesia's 
population includes 29 060 adults in 12.688 
households living in 312 communities at 13 of 
Indonesia’s provinces. In the book community 
characteristics and facilities (book 1 section 
G) provide the question about people's 
habits in saving/ borrowing in BMT whose 
location is divided into two, namely inside the 
community residents (in-access) and outside 
the community residents (out-access).
Meanwhile, in the books of individual 
and household characteristics are also available 
the question of religion and the status of 
individual religiosity in every community 
(book section 3A TR). Therefore, the status of 
access is only available at the community level, 
then the characteristic determinant on an 
individual level as religiosity, risk preferences, 
social capital and the level of household 
characteristics such as the ownership of the 
business, with the exception of expenditure 
per ca pita, aggregated into the community 
level.
The process of aggregation is done in 
two (2) phases. First, adding the data at the 
individual and household levels, both in 
numerical and binary into a community level. 
Second, followed by making the proportion 
(ratio) by dividing this ﬁgure by the number 
of population in the community. Thus all 
relevant data is the data BMT consumer 
agencies such as the ratio of the proportion 
of the number of Muslims in a community, 
the proportion of religiously Muslims in a 
community and so on.
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Table 1. Individual and Household Characteristics Aggregated at Community Level
Individual
Aggregated at
community
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
 Muslim (1 = Yes 0 = No)  Muslim 296 0.91 0.18 0.02 1
Muslim*Religious (1 = Yes; 0 = No)  musrel 296 0.88 0.18 0.02 1
Risk-Preference resiko (1= Risk Averter; 0 = others)  risk 310 0.92 0.06 0.43 1
Help neihgbour (1 = Yes; 0 = No)  soccap 310 0.98 0.04 0.50 1
Household  
Have business (1 = Yes; 0 = No)  usaha 310 0.47 0.19 0.00 1
Expendiiture per capita (mean_ln of exp)  exp 310 12.98 0.38 12.13 14.16
Community (Village level)
 Community habits in saving and borrowing (access) at BMT and another MFI if 
 BMT located inside the village (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 312 0.06 0.24 0 1
 BMT located outside the village (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 312 0.19 0.39 0 1
 Another MFI located indise (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 310 0.17 0.38 0 1
 Another MFI outside (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 310 0.33 0.47 0 1
 Community residents (1= rural; 0 = urban) 310 0.38 0.49 0 1
 Wealth level (1=rich; above median of exp, 0=others) 310 0.48 0.5 0 1
 Difference in distance between BMT and other MFI
Variable and Measurement
This section will try to describe the process 
to generate multiple dependent variables and 
controls used in the analysis.
Risk Preferences
To measure the level of risk aversion, it 
is used questions related to personal ﬁnancial 
risk in the data characteristics of individual/
household book section 3A SI. Two questions 
that are analyzed risk preferences are questions 
SI21 and SI22. If the selection of respondents 
performance SI21 question are C and tested 
through cross- checking the consistency 
of the answers of the questions SI22. If 
the respondent is then also answered C on 
questions he regarded having SI22 preference 
avoid the risk (risk-averse). A value of 1 is the 
code for the response to avoid the risk, and 
the values of 1 encoded for the other (multiply 
risk-lover and risk-neutral).
Muslim Religiosity
The characteristics of individuals/ 
households in IFLS4 are revealed on the book 
section 3A TR11 TR on the questionnaire, 
respondents are also asked to evaluate their 
own religiosity of size 4 negative scale ranging 
from; "1. The very obedient", "obedient 2", 
"3 somewhat obedient" and "disobedient 
4.". Furthermore, on the question TR12, 
there is also a question of the religion of the 
respondents so that they can choose between 
Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism and No answer. 
Item Confucianism and did not answer are 
dropped from the analysis. Furthermore, 
these two variables; religion and religiosity are 
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interacted. In accordance with the objectives 
of this study, the variation religiosity of 
Muslim respondents only would be the main 
repressors. Question of religiosity in IFLS-4 
is a question of self-assessment. It is therefore 
necessary to examine how the answers to these 
questions relate to the observed behaviour. For 
adherents of each religion, IFLS-4 is asked for 
a pair of questions about a person's religious 
practices. Muslim TR13 are asked to answer 
questions about how many times they pray 
(shalat) every day and whether they observe 
kosher dietary needs. A study in the diﬀerent 
themes but in the context and the same variable 
(Gaduh, 2012) uses this data to validate the 
self-assessment of respondents religiosity. The 
following table analyzes used in his study
Table 2. Distribution of Worship Practice Muslim Respondents by Level of Religiosity
Not religious Somewhat religious Religious Very religious Refused to answer
Do not Practice 0.66 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.19
Between 0 and 5 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.09 0.07
5 times 0.03 0.29 0.73 0.63 0.47
More than 5 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.23 0.07
Refused to answer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21
Sumber : Gaduh (2012)
Table 2 shows the pattern of a strong 
correlation between a person's self-assessment 
of religiosity and adherence religious practices. 
For Muslim respondents, the more religious he 
assesses himself, the more likely that he follows 
(and beyond) the amount of obligatory prayers 
ﬁve times a day. Slightly diﬀerent and for the 
purpose of simpliﬁcation of analysis, then in 
this context, then the answer options 1, 2 and 
3 are categorized as religious and encoded with 
1, while 0 for other answers. The scale is then 
obtained additional information that each 
additional 1 (one) unit of worship will increase 
the probability of respondents to be religious.
Figure 1. Margin Map--Pray and Religiosity Probability
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MFI competition measures
Throughout this analysis, we use three 
measures of competition deﬁned as follows:
• Presence, indicating whether there is any 
MFI competitor in/outside village.
• Proximity of the closest competitor, if there 
is any, measured by proximity
= 1
1 + d
In which d = diﬀerence in distance between 
BMT with another MFI from the village centre 
(distance of BMT- mean distance of MFI), 
according to two types of location (inside and 
outside the village). Thus the proxy value is in 
the range -> 1> +. The more positive the value 
of proximity, closer others MFI to BMT, to be 
accessed by the community.
Estimation Strategy
Ordinary Probit
To estimate the possibility of community 
access to the BMT (1 if yes and 0 if not), 
linear probability model (probit regression) is 
used. In the linear probability function, the 
dependent variable is a binary variable that 
takes the value of zero or one. For the record, 
there are two models that will be tested here. 
Both models that have the same dependent 
variable are the variable interest (primary); 
religiosity and various other control variables 
at the individual and household level which is 
already aggregated into the community level. 
The model is as follows:
v iv hv v vA X H G      
The variable ivX  i s  the vector of 
aggregate characteristics of individuals in 
the community. While hvH  is the vector of 
aggregate characteristics of households in the 
community. While vG  is the vector of variables 
at the level of the community itself. 
To estimate the competition (with other 
MFIs) to community probability access to 
the BMT, we should use 2-SLS probability 
model (iv probit regression). The estimation of 
the presence of other MFIs (as a competition 
indicator) should calculate it’s rational decision 
to presence inside community residence. 
Several reason must be accommodated. At 
least the MFIs will presence in speciﬁc place 
because there are another MFIs has already 
presence in another place. Therefore in this 
context we instrumented the MFIs inside 
community-type of presence with the MFI 
outside community-type of presence.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents the results of a 
description of the data and the estimates of 
the analysis with an econometric model in the 
previous section.
Probit regression process shown in Table 
3 tries to give an answer to the questions. 
Processed regression shows that although the 
relation of distance with access probability to 
BMT have the negative sign (direction) -, in 
accordance to the hypothesis, but the relation 
is not signiﬁcant, whether BMT located inside 
or outside community residents. 
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Figure 2. Margin Map-- Distance and Access Probability
Several studies suggest that distance is an 
important factor that weakens people’s ﬁnancial 
access in some countries (Seep Network, 2006), 
including in the United States (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002). When considering a transaction 
between two agents in the case of households, 
and individuals or groups of individuals 
and microﬁnance institutions, the eﬀect of 
distance is translated into physical costs that 
must be paid by agents to be able to realize 
the transaction. Some literatures describe the 
transmission mechanism of distance to access 
to the credit markets both in terms of producers 
and consumers in several ways. From the micro 
ﬁnance institutions as a producer, ﬁrst, there is a 
direct transaction costs, ie the cost of transport 
to provide ﬁnancial services to the borrowers. 
In a competitive ﬁnancial market, the cost is 
borne by the borrower in the form of more 
intense screening and higher interest rates. The 
second implication is the increase in the cost 
of monitoring: if the lender needs to gather 
information prior to approval of the borrower 
(adverse selection), or monitor the borrower 
after the loan is approved (moral hazard), it is 
performed during a visit to monitor. This in 
turn means tighter lending restrictions and the 
imposition of higher interest rates. Meanwhile, 
from the borrower as a consumer, opportunistic 
behaviour - i.e. choosing consumption rather 
than investment - tend to more easily unfold 
the greater the distance from microﬁnance 
institutions, because of the possibility of a lower 
detected (Presbitero, 2011). 
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Pr(
To
tka
ses
)
.4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1
riskpop
Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs
Figure 3. Margin Map-- Risk-averse and Access Probability
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Figure 4. Margin Map-- Religiosity and Access Probability
While the status of risk preference turns 
to determine access to the BMT, in a positive 
direction although not signiﬁcant. The greater 
proportion of type risk-averse individual in 
a community then they are more likely to 
choose the access to BMT located within the 
community. Another interesting result in ﬁgure 
3 above showed that, the status of religiosity 
turns out determine access to the BMT in 
a positive direction signiﬁcantly. The more 
religious a Muslim community, the larger their 
probability of access to BMT.
Follow-up question is; does the pattern 
of this relationship apply to all conditions? Is 
there another explanation for this condition? 
Therefore, this fact needs to be tested by 
analysis of the inﬂuence of the control variables. 
Table 4 shows the probit regression with some 
additional control variables. Processed results 
of probit regression with several control 
variables explain at least two things. First, 
answer the questions on the discussion of the 
previous 3.1. It turns out from the side of BMT 
access status in the community at all of the 
model; namely models 3,4, and 5. The status 
of religiosity (Muslim religious) is enough to 
explain the pattern of relationships. Second, 
household characteristics contribute to better 
determine the status of community access to 
the BMT located at their communities. 
On the other hand, this could indicate 
that the Muslims of various strata and status 
have access to BMT. Meanwhile, it turns out a 
diﬀerent control variables, namely preferences 
towards risk, also turned out to be a deﬁning 
aspect of the determinants of access. Probit 
regression processed shown in Table 4 shows that 
individual turned out to be Muslims as a whole, 
whether religious or not, it is better to avoid the 
risk (risk-averter). This is consistent with the 
concept that underlies the practice of Shariah 
ﬁnancial institutions in general, i.e. transactions 
for deﬁnite purposes, not speculation. 
Furthermore, the social capital variables, 
it turns negative, although not signiﬁcantly 
related to the variable access. Variable social 
capital here is formed from questions of 
individual activities in the community to help 
102  Al Masraf (Jurnal Lembaga Keuangan dan Perbankan)-Volume 1, No.1, Januari-Juni 2016
others. Although activity does not speciﬁcally 
mention the type of activity of lending and 
borrowing money, but the ﬁndings are at 
least in line with the statement of some 
other studies. Research conducted that BMT 
presence as a source of funding has reduced 
the intensity of other informal ﬁnancial loans 
in a community.
Probit regression models (3), (4) and 
(5) in table 3 are several model that already 
incorporate variable; location of a community, 
rural or urban area. The estimation results 
indicate that in fact the relation of religiosity 
and risk preferences variables with the type of 
access to the BMT unchanged, including the 
level of its signiﬁcance. In addition, estimated 
result also indicates that communities location’s 
relations (in urban areas) with various types of 
access to BMT is a negative one although not 
signiﬁcant. At the same time also shows that 
in fact the BMT just distributing rather evenly 
in urban areas.
Furthermore, those probit regression 
models above already incorporate variable; 
community prosperity level, which is 
measured by the threshold of communities 
median expenditure. The estimation results 
indicate that in fact the level of prosperity 
of a community relations with various types 
of access to BMT is a positive one, although 
not signiﬁcantly. It also shows that in fact the 
new BMT distributing rather evenly in the 
community (samples) are relatively better oﬀ 
than average total population.
Competition With Others MFI
This section presents the analysis of BMT 
competition with other LK and its impact on 
the probability of access to BMT. Discussion of 
this aspects includes two parts, on the impact of 
the presence and the proximity of other MFIs.
Presence of others MFI
Processed regression shows that the presence 
of other MFIs inside the community residence 
reduces probability access to BMT signiﬁcantly, 
in accordance to the hypothesis. McIntosh and 
Wydick (2005), in their theoretical paper on 
competition and microfinance showed that 
competition may prove detrimental to some 
or all of the borrowers in a microﬁnance 
market. In its initial monopolistic stage there 
are rents to be made for the lender and it is 
proﬁtable to serve both the more and less 
proﬁtable participants due to cross subsidies. 
Once competition sets in however, prices will 
be pushed down due to Bertrand competition 
and client-maximizing behaviour, thus rents 
will be eliminated. 
Lending institutions then ﬁnd themselves 
under greater performance pressure, due 
to which their focus shifts to the more 
proﬁtable segment of the market, leaving 
the more unproﬁtable and mostly poorest 
and neediest on the sideline (McIntosh 
& Wydick 2005). It could tempted the 
BMT client to take multiple loan. The 
authors argue that this process coupled with 
increasing information asymmetries can lead 
to negative externalities for the borrowers. 
Especially, when diﬀerrentiating customers 
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along their proﬁtability and time preference 
characteristics, the poorest are neglected ﬁrst 
and the least patient borrowers are worst 
oﬀ, as they slip into "double dipping" or 
"overlapping" - which means taking out 
multiple loans.
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Figure 5. Margin Map-- Proximity and Outside Access Probability
Proximity with others MFI
It turns out the resultant of (net) impact of 
the presence of other MFIs is also ambiguous 
on the probability of access to BMT. On one 
condition, the existence of other MFIs plays 
as substitute role for BMT. However the 
processed regression shows that the proximity 
between BMT with other MFIs which located 
inside the community residence increase 
probability access to BMT signiﬁcantly, in 
accordance to the hypothesis. Figure 5 above 
shows that the probability of access to BMT 
grows signiﬁcantly as long as it’s proximity 
increasing. 
There are monotone changes from a 
negative value (BMT are further away than 
MFIs) to positive (MFIs are further away 
than BMT) as an increase in the probability 
access. Every (about) 2 km distance reduced 
between these two MFIs location will increase 
the probability of access to BMT by 10%. 
Thus if BMT (even only 1) is located inside 
the community, this institution still remains 
an option for Muslim respondents who are 
relatively more religious.
CONCLUSION
Linear probability estimation in the analysis 
section shows several important conclusions. 
First, individuals who are more religious Muslims 
have a greater probability for access to BMT. The 
conclusion of this study is in accordance with the 
existing hypotheses and ﬁndings from previous 
studies. Probit regression estimation results are 
displayed on a variety of estimation model above 
shows other interesting ﬁndings. It turns out the 
existence of other MFI reduces the probability 
access to BMT. 
In line with the research Pearlman (2012) 
which stated that the problem of access to MFIs 
is not only related issues which is dependent 
upon the skill entrepreneur, but also fear has 
not been able to manage the risks in everyday 
life, such as consumption smoothing eﬀort if 
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there is an external shock. It is inexplicable 
that in a model with access to BMT in the 
community, consumer risk preferences (risk-
averse) are positively related to it. 
The important for incumbent micro-
lenders is also to know which types of 
individuals are most likely to be drawn away 
from them by competition. Diﬀerential 
abilities at collateral collection, screening, 
and monitoring lead diﬀerent types of lending 
institutions to focus on diﬀerent client bases. 
According to this theory, considering that 
our data consist solely of current clients in a 
village-banking institution, we would expect 
to see the 'best' clients being drawn away by 
lenders who invest more in screening and oﬀer 
better terms. Additionally, considering the 
pre-eminent role of collateral in mitigating 
moral hazard in lending, clients who depart 
for higher-level lenders should be those 
that posse the used assets to those lenders as 
collateral and as screening tools.
In the end, the common thread that can 
be drawn from here is the distance that is 
very important to determine the probability 
access to BMT. In the context of this study, 
which assumed a limited number of BMT 
per community (only 1) and consider the 
availability of other MFIs, then the distance as 
a means of natural selection for consumer access 
decision the BMT. Therefore, as a consequence 
for the BMT, this could be a reference to 
determine the mechanism of diﬀerent services 
for consumers with diﬀerent types.
Future strategies to expand BMT 
outreach should consider that moral hazard 
is a critical issue and that physical proximity 
could contribute to attenuate it. However, 
subsequent analysis are necessary to deepen 
the role of distance in microcredit along 
several lines, in order to draw more sensible 
policy guidance. The first one would focus 
on alternative settings and especially on rural 
ones, in which low population density and 
poor transportation can make distance a 
more binding constraint. A further extension 
of this kind of analysis might focus on the 
role of distance on repayment rates and on 
margin rates applied by the BMT.
Research Limitations 
Some obvious limitations to this study, 
especially on the issue of the quality and 
limitations of the data. Data available for 
the dependent variable are data at the macro 
level, the community. While the majority of 
independent variables such as individual and 
household characteristics are data on the micro 
level. Thus the estimation can be done then 
the aggregation of data from the micro to the 
macro level has many weaknesses, namely a 
selection of risks to be taken. In addition, 
data IFLS module is only available in IFLS-4, 
which means the estimation process can only 
be done by cross-section includes only 312 
observations.
In addition, variations in the distribution 
sub-sample also provides some disadvantages. 
Especially very diﬃcult to determine causality 
when testing the factors in the model. 
Furthermore, because the sample is very 
small, it is not possible to divide the sample in 
accordance with the distribution. Because the 
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sample is already limited, this test produces a 
small statistical power and meaning.
Third, some scale-forming measurement 
variables. Therefore variables used here are 
socio-cultural variables, then the accuracy of 
the concept and selection of key measurement 
indicators become important in the estimation 
process. Improper selection of indicators will 
aﬀect the measurement and estimation bias 
the results. Moreover, as the plural of research 
with the use of qualitative variables such as 
socio-cultural, then the endogeneity problem 
becomes one source of vulnerability (non-
robust) the main results of the estimation.
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